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ABSTRACT. Should society intervene to prevent the risky behavior of precocious
teenagers even if it would be impermissible to intervene with adults who engage
in the same risky behavior? The problem is well illustrated by the legal case of the
13-year-old Dutch girl Laura Dekker, who set out in 2009 to become the youngest
person ever to sail around the world alone, succeeding in January 2012. In this
paper we use her case as a point of entry for discussing the fundamental question
of how to demarcate childhood from adulthood. After summarizing the case, we
identify a ‘demarcation dilemma’ that frames much of the public and expert
debate. On the one hand, it seems morally imperative ‘to treat like alike’, which
means that both children and adults should be allowed to undertake all actions for
which they have the relevant competences. On the other hand, requiring pro-
portional treatment of children and adults seems to neglect the special nature of
childhood as a distinct stage in life that ends at a specific age. We introduce the
notion of a ‘regime of childhood’ to deal with this problem. This regime includes
several dimensions, including the limited liability for children, the supervisory
responsibilities of parents, the role of age-based thresholds, and the overarching
purpose of childhood as a context for developing autonomy. We argue that, all
things considered, there are good reasons not to shift to a regime that offers
individual children the option of qualifying for adulthood on the basis of age-
neutral criteria.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ordinarily, when teenagers are inclined to undertake dangerous or
risky activities, the opposition comes from their parents. As a result,
debates about the decision-making authority of teenagers collapse
into debates over parental authority. But when parents have no
objection to their teenagers’ risky behavior, the issue of teenagers’
decision-making authority comes more sharply into focus, raising
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fundamental questions about the nature of autonomy and the
grounds for treating children differently from adults. In particular,
should society restrict skilled and experienced teenagers’ risky be-
havior when it could not permissibly restrict the same behavior by
less competent adults?
As our point of entry for discussing these problems, we bring in a
case that arguably falls into this category. In 2009, Laura Dekker
(age thirteen) announced – with her father’s support – her plans to
sail around the world alone. The journey would take approximately
2 years. If successful, she would become the youngest person ever to
sail around the world. She completed her quest on January 21, 2012.1
Her journey was preceded, however, by a lengthy legal battle that
began when the Dutch Council for Child Protection asked the courts
to take custody of Dekker away from her father (with whom she was
living) so as to prevent her from departing. The legal proceedings
were widely reported, and the case generated heated debates in the
Dutch media. Dekker’s plans brought to the surface – and indeed
came to symbolize – widespread disagreements about the appropriate
norms for the upbringing of children. Those arguing in favor of
Dekker’s freedom to do something adventurous and inspiring were
staunchly opposed by those arguing that this was an irresponsibly
risky undertaking that any sensible parent (and in the last instance, the
state) should prohibit. Intuitions about Dekker’s case diverged
widely, among experts as well as the wider public.
Our aim in this paper is not to adjudicate whether Dekker should
have been allowed to sail or not. Rather, we will use the case as a
stepping stone to assess the different normative strategies that could
be used to get a grip on practical questions like these and to show
how these strategies reveal different ways of conceiving childhood.
First we introduce the case of Dekker in some detail, presenting the
main features of the courts’ treatment of her case (Sect. II). We then
formulate the central moral dilemma of paternalistic interference in
children’s lives. On the one hand, it seems to be morally imperative
1 Details on Dekker’s journey can be found at http://www.lauradekker.nl/. She is not the only one
to have this ambition: several others aged 16 or 17 completed similar journeys. The 16-year-old
Australian Jessica Watson completed a similar trip in May 2010 and the 17-year-old British Mike Perham
completed his trip in August 2009. For an overview, see Anouk Lorie, ‘Should teenagers be allowed to
sail solo around the world?’ CNN, October 24, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-24/world/intl.
teen.solo.sailing.crash_1_vendee-globe-solo-circumnavigation-solo-trip?_s=PM:WORLD; and http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_youth_solo_sailing_circumnavigations (last consulted January 26, 2012).
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‘to treat like alike’, which means that both children and adults should
be allowed to undertake all actions for which they have the relevant
competences (this is the ‘competence-based position’). On the other
hand, such an imperative of proportional treatment of children and
adults seems to neglect the special nature of childhood as a distinct
stage in life that ends at a specific age (this is the ‘age-based posi-
tion’). Our main research question in this paper is how to escape this
‘demarcation dilemma’: how should decision-making authority over
children’s actions be allocated (Sect. III)?
In the remainder of the paper we argue that both horns of this
dilemma – competence-based and age-based – should be avoided, or
rather integrated on a higher level, in the context of justifying a specific
‘regime of childhood’. We begin by discussing Tamar Schapiro’s Kan-
tian argument about why childhood should be seen as a separate stage
in a child’s development, a stage that requires the room for experi-
mentation that can be provided only by not holding children fully
responsible for their actions. While Schapiro’s argument is important, it
still is vulnerable to (a reformulated version of) the demarcation di-
lemma (Sect. IV). Therefore we propose a broader framework within
which to understand demarcation disputes. We suggest possible ways
to arrange and institutionalize what we call a ‘regime of childhood’. The
elaboration and justification of a regime involves demonstrating the
relevance and interconnection of several aspects, especially the purpose
of children’s autonomy development, the limited liability for children,
parental supervisory responsibility, and age-based demarcation
(Sect. V). We argue that, all things considered, there are good reasons
not to shift to a regime with an age-neutral basis for lifting parental
responsibility and child tutelage (Sect. VI). Finally, we will comment on
Dekker’s case in the light of this broader framework (Sect. VII).
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER DEKKER’S JOURNEY
In all of the court proceedings, Dekker and her father were opposed
by the Council for Child Protection of the Netherlands. Child neglect
cases often involve courts having to decide whether to support the
point of view of the parent or the child. Here however both are
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united in a struggle against the state’s agencies.2 The relevant legal
norm is that the parent(s) should not show ‘grave neglect’ in their
care of their children. The main question for the courts was whether
Dekker’s father had shown such neglect by not prohibiting her from
carrying out her plans to sail around the world. In ruling on the
father’s duties, however, the court had to consider whether the plan
itself posed such a threat to Dekker’s well-being that paternalist
intervention was necessary. Between August 2009 and July 2010
three different courts gave six verdicts on Dekker’s case.3 The first
five placed and kept Dekker under temporary surveillance, so that
she was not allowed to start her journey. The last verdict, in June
2010, lifted these restrictions, so that she was allowed to go. She
began her solo journey from Gibraltar on 21 August 2010, sailing first
to the Dutch Antilles, to which she returned, after 27,000 nautical
miles, at 16 1/3 years of age.
The case started with the Council for Child Protection demanding
permanent surveillance, both because it believed 13-year-old children
in general do not have the so-called ‘coping capacities’ (dealing with
heavy weather, loneliness, lack of sleep) required for such a journey
and because they have a series of ‘developmental tasks’ which would
come under serious threat. The court, however, was dissatisfied with
a general description of the coping capacities and developmental
tasks and abilities of 13-year-olds. It granted temporary surveillance,
so that experts could investigate to what extent Dekker herself had
these capacities and had satisfactorily prepared for this journey. An
investigation of Dekker’s specific abilities would determine her right
to sail. The courts split these issues into two sets of requirements.
On the one hand, the courts were worried about Dekker’s cog-
nitive development, her safety, and her coping capacities. The courts
regarded appropriate arrangements for her cognitive development
(schooling), adequate safety measures and training of her coping
capacities as sine qua nons for permitting her to sail. Initially the court
saw serious problems with respect to each of these requirements.
2 The context is that Dekker’s parents are divorced, that Dekker’s father is a sailing fanatic, that
Dekker was born while her parents were sailing around the world, that Dekker has spent the first
4 years of her life on the seas, and, that she had learned sailing at a very young age.
3 These are in chronological order: (1) Court of Utrecht, 28-8-2009. LJN: BJ 6275. (2) Court of
Utrecht, 8-9-2009, LJN: BJ7911. (3) Court of Utrecht 30-10-2009. LJN: BK1598. (4) Court of Appeal of
Arnhem, 4-5-2010, LJN: BM2916. (5) Court of Middelburg, 17-6-2010, LJN: BM8125. (6) Court of
Middelburg, 27-7-2010, LJN: BN2481. All texts can be found at http://www.rechtspraak.nl/default.htm
(all translations are our own).
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The court-ordered surveillance was intended to give Dekker the
opportunity to make better arrangements regarding distance-learn-
ing, safety precautions, ‘sleep management’ and so on.4 After almost
a year of preparations, the last court judged that these arrangements
had been made adequately. Dekker had prepared to follow the
World Schooling program, written a sailing plan which detailed the
various stages of the journey, and taken other necessary precau-
tions.5
On the other hand, the courts looked at Dekker’s social, emo-
tional and identity development. Here the courts took a less
straightforward approach. The psychologist who was asked for an
assessment concluded the following. With respect to her social
development Dekker ‘is inclined to operate independently (…), so
that friendships take on a somewhat functional character and do not
seem to rest upon reciprocity (on the basis of reciprocal interests)’.6
Dekker’s emotional development was characterized by ‘one-
sided[ness]’, ‘flatness’ and ‘little emotional sensitivity’. She was
judged to ‘wave aside emotions like fear and sadness’. Moreover,
‘the emotional side is poorly integrated in her personality develop-
ment as a whole’. With respect to her identity development Dekker
shows ‘remarkably little interest in acceptance by her peer group, is
self-centered and very self-satisfied’.
The Council for Child Protection took all of these psychological
judgments to indicate that the solo journey would threaten her
further development: she would be able to engage in ‘superficial and
functional contacts only’, would not have occasions to work on her
emotional development, and would lack the contact with people of
her own age needed to develop her identity. By contrast, the court
found no ‘serious developmental threat’. The court also stated that
her emotional development is not as one-sided as the Council be-
lieved, and questioned whether this alleged one-sidedness would be
4 Court of Utrecht 30-10-2009, considerations 2.11–2.14. In May 2010, the Court of Appeal saw still
insufficient progress on these dimensions. See Appeal Court of Arnhem, 4-5-2010, considerations 4.24–
4.25.
5 Court of Middelburg, 27-7-2010, considerations 2.5.5 and 2.5.6. Note that this part of the judgment
was largely based on the fact that the governmental agencies at that point in time agreed with Dekker
and her father that the journey was safe on these scores, not on an independent assessment of the court
itself. In May 2010, the Court of Appeal still saw insufficient progress in these regards. See Court of
Appeal of Arnhem, 4-5-2010, considerations 4.24–4.25.
6 All quotations in this paragraph and the next one taken from Court of Utrecht 30-10-2009,
considerations 2.7–2.10.
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reduced if she were not allowed to undertake her solo journey. The
court further judged that Dekker’s identity development might be
abnormal compared to that of her peers, but that her development
did not pose a threat to her. Moreover, ‘she will have fewer prob-
lems from not being able to mirror herself to her teens than would
be the case with an average child’.
All in all, the court in Utrecht did not see an impediment to the
journey because of Dekker’s current development. As long as the
journey did not aggravate her supposed developmental issues, it was
not a reason to keep her home. However, this conclusion was not
followed straightforwardly by the other courts. The Court of Appeal
was much more critical of the threat to Dekker’s development.7 The
Court of Middelburg had the final word. It concluded that insuffi-
cient information prevented it from making a good judgment of the
matter. Meanwhile, the relation between the governmental agencies
and Dekker and her family had seriously deteriorated to the point
where Dekker and her family refused any further cooperation. On
the basis of these circumstances, the court concluded that further
prolonging the surveillance arrangement would likely be more of a
threat to her social, emotional and identity development than lifting
it. As a consequence, it allowed her to go.8
In conclusion, the court’s verdict to let Dekker undertake her
journey is based on handling the two sets of requirements differ-
ently. The court was strict on what we will refer to throughout the
paper as a child’s ‘technical competences’. These are always related
to a specific activity that a child wants permission to undertake (here:
sailing). The court had considerably more difficulty in determining
the relevance of the second set of issues, the threats to Dekker’s
social, emotional and identity development (later we will take these
together in our notion of ‘autonomy development’); in the end it
even denied that a positive evaluation of these was a necessary
condition for allowing her to sail.
III. THE DEMARCATION DILEMMA
Central to our analysis of the Dekker case is what we will refer to as the
‘demarcation dilemma’. This dilemma turns on whether to use age or
7 See Court of Appeal of Arnhem, 4-5-2010, considerations 4.21–4.23.
8 Court of Middelburg, 27-7-2010, considerations 2.5.8 and 25.9.
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competence as the primary threshold criterion for decision-making
authority. What we will call ‘age-based’ theories treat the person’s age
itself as decisive (be it 12 or 16 or 21), such that all children of a certain age
will be subjected to the same rule. This provides a practicable and clear
criterion but also seems to do injustice to competent or precocious
minors by denying them authoritative decision-making status on the
basis of morally irrelevant considerations. By contrast, ‘competence-
based theories’ treat each individual’s actual decision-making compe-
tence or proficiency as determinative. The courts in the Dekker case did
not decide the matter by a fixed age limit (as most countries do in
determining a well-specified set of often-recurring risks like drinking and
driving), nor did it tie Dekker’s fate to the average competencies of
people of her own age. Rather, Dekker’s actual technical competencies
were regarded as decisive. In taking this line, the courts adopted a
competence-based view, while many opponents in public debate took
an age-based view. In this section we hope to show that both age-based
and competence-based theories are morally problematic.
The problem with age-based theories is that they seem to rely
on ageist discrimination against children. Our current legal systems
regularly rely on systematic restrictions on the individual liberty
and political representation of a large segment of the population,
simply on the basis of age. This fact clearly requires a convincing
argument for why such matters ought to be decided on the basis of
how many years one has been alive. It’s not, of course, that age per
se is morally relevant. Age-based theories are characterized by their
use of age as a proxy for morally relevant factors that often
coincide with youth, such as inexperience, impulsivity, or igno-
rance.9 This linkage is what critics of age-based criteria for decision-
making authority do not accept. Empirically, cases of precocious
children demonstrate how unreliable age can be as a proxy. And as
a matter of principle, respect for the equal dignity of persons as
individuals would seem to require that they not be lumped to-
gether on the basis of a morally irrelevant criterion. Instead, these
critics insist that treatment be tied directly to the individual’s
9 Cf. in a different context (Boxill 1992, pp. 9–18).
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possession of the requisite proficiency or competence in the do-
main in question.10
This seems to suggest that competence-based views are superior.
But advocates of this position encounter a powerful set of objections
regarding what it would actually mean in (legal) practice. As
Feinberg puts the point, ‘the law cannot do without rigid lines
dividing ‘‘standard persons’’, who because of their age are presumed
to have sufficient capacity to play some given legal role, from those
below that age who are not. That is because direct tests of capacity
in particular cases without recourse to such rules would be cum-
bersome to administer, or unreliable, or both’ (Feinberg 1986,
p. 326).11 There is a troubling potential for bias in competence-
assessments. Determining someone’s age is ordinarily a value-free
and reliable affair. Processes of determining whether someone is
‘sufficiently competent’, by contrast, are ordinarily value-laden,
highly contested, and riddled with problems of reliability – all of
which open the door to systematic biases.
In some cases, of course, procedures of competence-assessment
are rather well established, such as getting a driver’s license. But
matters quickly become much more controversial once we have to
assess issues such as Dekker’s psychological preparedness to make her
solo voyage. These determinations create the potential for bias and
abuse, with vague criteria being interpreted in ways that go against
the interests of the agents themselves. In addition, competence-cri-
teria turn out not to be neutral between different ways of leading a
life, where each way has its own distinct prerequisites. For example,
does Dekker’s cool affect and emotional distance from peers mean
that she is at psychological risk or does it rather mean that she is
especially well suited for a solo journey around the world? Trying to
answer that question quickly draws one into substantive issues of
how she can best lead her life, issues that governments and courts
are rightly keen to avoid.
Up to this point there seems to be an irresolvable dilemma
between ageist discrimination against children, on the one hand, and
10 This position is taken by child-liberation authors such as Farson (1974) and Holt (1974). Tamar
Schapiro uses the concept of ‘proficiency’ to challenge this view (which we introduce in the next
section). Note that a child-liberationist need not be opposed to age-based criteria and may simply be
opposed to the current age of majority being so high.
11 Similar points are raised in Brighouse (2003, p. 702) and Archard (2004, pp. 85–90).
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the risks of unworkable and controversial competence tests, on the
other (Schrag 1977, p. 336). Even so, defenders of age-neutral,
competence-based approaches might still claim to have the moral
high ground. After all, they will say, the difficulties and even political
risks involved in administering tests for psychological maturity or
decision-making competence pale in comparison to the moral vio-
lation involved in systematic discrimination on the basis of the
morally irrelevant criterion of age. If the choice is between prag-
matism and morality, the advocates of pragmatism seem to be on
shaky grounds, especially when they are adults defending an auto-
matic privilege.
This conclusion is too quick, however, for it overlooks the fact
that there is a more principled objection to a competence-based
approach. As a principle, age neutrality cuts two ways. Competence
is competence, and so it would not only be those under the age of 18
who would have to demonstrate they make the grade for decision-
making authority. On this approach, 40-year-olds who fail to meet
the standards would fall into the same category with incompetent
12-year-olds. But is it really a good idea to start assessing the emo-
tional maturity and relationship-skills of adults in determining
whether they should be allowed to sail solo around the world? An
age-neutral approach has the unpalatable result of opening the door
to rampant paternalism towards adults.
Defenders of age-neutrality could, of course, bite the bullet here,
candidly welcoming an expanded scope for intervening in the lives of
immature and incompetent individuals above the age of 18. At this
point, however, it becomes clear that age-neutral, competence-based
criteria for adulthood sit very uneasily with the fundamental liberal
principle that adult persons have a special authority over their own
self-regarding choices, including what others deem ‘bad’ decisions. If
the liberal distinction between harm to others (a basis for interfer-
ence) and harm to self (no basis for interference) is to have any bite,
at least some class of persons needs to have the possibility of actually
harming themselves. The paradoxical feature of this class of persons,
normally called ‘adults’, is that they all have a ‘right of autonomy’ to
an equal degree – even though they may differ markedly in the
extent to which they have developed the skills, character, and
capacities typical of fully autonomous persons. In other words, it is a
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core commitment of liberalism that, although autonomy, in one
sense, develops over time and admits of gradations, in another sense
it marks a threshold. Everybody above that threshold has decision-
making authority and ‘rights of autonomy’, such that further dif-
ferences in their capacities are of no moral significance (Feinberg
1986). In this second sense, ‘having autonomy’ is a categorical dis-
tinction in status: one either is or isn’t an autonomous agent. By
ruling out any role for age thresholds, competence-based approaches
have trouble avoiding a problematically tight linkage between de-
grees of decision-making authority and degrees of competence.12
In light of the foregoing discussion, it becomes clear that resolving
the demarcation dilemma ultimately requires finding a way to pre-
serve a liberal policy towards adults that doesn’t involve arbitrary
discrimination against children. For this end, however, we need a
principled way to explain why treating childhood as a separate stage
in life is not merely determined by pragmatic considerations.
IV. CHILDHOOD AS A SEPARATE STAGE IN LIFE
Up to this point, we have presupposed the demarcation dilemma is
about whether age or competence should mark the cut-off point
between childhood tutelage and adult decision-making authority.
What this focus on a specific criterion misses, however, is the larger
context within which the child–adult contrast is supposed to make
sense. What we propose is to reverse the order of explanation,
justifying an approach to demarcation in light of the meaning and
distinctive purpose of childhood. What first needs elaboration, then,
is an overall account of what ‘being a child’ is about, including the
rights, duties, powers, immunities, and entitlements which are
jointly constitutive of what it is to be a child.
Particularly useful in this context are two articles by Tamar
Schapiro: ‘What is a Child?’ (1999) and ‘Childhood and Personhood’
12 It might seem that a compromise position is available: adulthood could be attributed automati-
cally above a particular age (whether 16, 18 or 21), but children below that age could sue for adulthood
upon demonstrating exceptional competence. We consider a version of this proposal in Sect. VI below,
but it is important that by itself it remains trapped within the dilemma of demarcation, since from the
perspective of critics of age-based criteria, it is question-begging to assume an across-the-board
exemption from scrutiny (as to whether one is competent) on the basis of age; in the absence of a
legitimate reason for doing so, this amounts to arbitrary unequal treatment.
JOEL ANDERSON AND RUTGER CLAASSEN504
(2003). Schapiro begins with the claim that childhood is not a natural
category, the way the ability to walk or sail is. Developing such
‘proficiencies’ is not sufficient for being an adult. Rather, adulthood
(like childhood) is an attributed, normative status that exists only in
virtue of being ascribed and earned. Just as physically possessing an
object is insufficient for being able to claim it as one’s property,
developing certain abilities (or reaching the age of 18) is not by itself
what makes one an adult. In the absence of a wider set of practices
and institutions, neither property nor adulthood exists (Schapiro
2003, p. 585). Thus Schapiro rejects the proficiency argument (which
is a species of what we have called ‘competence-based views’), but
not in favor of an age-based view. Rather, she presents what seems
to be a third alternative that has the potential to transcend the
previous two views. In this alternative, the distinction between
children and adults is one of status. But what does this status consist
in?
In explaining her position, Schapiro draws on Kant’s under-
standing of the transition from the state of nature to civil society.
Civil society is not simply a condition in which certain features
present in the state of nature become more pronounced. Rather, the
emergence of civil society involves a group of individuals taking one
another to be members of civil society, as constitutive of a new way of
relating to one another. It is a fundamental shift in kind, not just in
degree. For our purposes, then, the key intuition is this: just as civil
society isn’t merely an incremental expansion of the political features
present in the state of nature, adulthood isn’t merely an incremental
expansion of a child’s abilities. Both involve a seismic shift whereby a
fundamental and distinctively normative transformation is brought
about – even if the properties and characteristics of the composite
parts change only gradually.
Schapiro describes the parallel shift from childhood to adulthood
as the emergence of a kind of ‘constitution’, a state of being orga-
nized as a self-guiding agent around a core set of commitments,
principles, and perspectives. What children lack is their own per-
spective on their choices, a constitution on the basis of which to
adjudicate between conflicting inclinations or impulses: ‘Thus the
condition of childhood is one in which the agent is not yet in a
position to speak in her own voice because there is no voice which
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counts as hers’ (Schapiro 1999, p. 729; 2003, pp. 587–589).13 Crucial
to Schapiro’s account is that, as with the transition from the state of
nature to civil society, the emergence of a perspective or voice is not
merely a matter of having a little more voice or perspective, since a
point of view is something one has only in virtue of one’s ways of
approaching and responding to the situations being integrated.14
This position makes it necessary for Schapiro to explain what
children are actually doing when they act. Contrary to Kant’s posi-
tion that children are characterized by mere ‘animality’ and cannot
actually be said to engage in action proper, Schapiro characterizes
what children are doing as a kind of pretending or ‘play’. ‘By
engaging in play, children more or less deliberately ‘try on’ selves to
be and worlds to be in’ (Schapiro 1999, p. 732). Just as, in pretending,
one can make the same movements that one would make ‘for real’ –
think of a bride and groom exchanging vows during a wedding
rehearsal – what happens when children express a point of view or
plan a course of action is fundamentally different from what happens
when the expressing and planning is done by adults. The difference is
normative: children’s doings and sayings do not have the same status
or meaning. Many children (especially teens) would understandably
chafe at the idea that what they are doing is pretend-play, but the
suspension of full responsibility is part of the social reality within
which children act. In this sense, even a high level of competence in
practical reason, self-understanding, and critical reflection is not
sufficient for being an adult. Only self-constitution qualifies.
The other part of Schapiro’s account is that, as with other forms
of rehearsal and pretend-play, children learn a great deal from the
increasingly serious rehearsal of activities such as expressing a per-
spective or deliberating about significant choices. Playing is a form of
13 Schapiro’s general line of argument is not completely new. Earlier Geoffrey Scarre argued that
paternalism towards children is legitimate since they lack ‘the ability to plan systematic policies of
action’ (Scarre 1980, p. 123). Also more recently Robert Noggle suggested that while children some-
times have the capacity for ‘simple agency’, they lack ‘fully stable moral selves’ (Noggle 2002, pp. 100–
101; also Noggle and Brennan 1997).
14 We here follow her 2003 article. In the 1999 article, Shapiro gave a different account. There she
argued that children gradually acquire authority over different ‘domains of discretion’. In some areas,
we allow them to act according to their own wishes while in other areas we are more reluctant to grant
them this kind of authority. As children grow older, the number of domains in which they achieve
discretion grows until finally all domains are under their control (Schapiro 1999, pp. 733–734). We agree
with Schapiro that the new, 2003 model fits better with her overall theory. The 1999 position is
mistaken in suggesting that decisions to grant discretion in particular domains relied on the basis of
‘local attributability arguments’. The competent child should not be seen as acting as ‘herself’ in any
domain, however well she acts.
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experimentation which allows the child to adopt different roles and
positions, so as to build up experiences about the world and one’s
place in it. According to Schapiro, a kind of bootstrapping takes
place, by which children prepare themselves for adulthood by
rehearsing for the time at which they step onto a different stage and
play the role of adults. Her discussion suggests that what is dis-
tinctive of childhood is that the social world within which children
play and rehearse is oriented toward that role – and that means that
there is room for experimentation and a gradual expansion of chal-
lenges. But children are not held responsible to the same extent as
adults, and above all they require supervision. Without these ele-
ments in place, the behavior of children no longer is that of play and
rehearsal, but rather hit-or-miss attempts at doing what adults do –
or mere attempts to survive. Indeed, in such cases we tend to speak
of individuals being ‘denied a childhood’.
Where does all of this leave us with respect to the demarcation
dilemma – our central issue in this paper? On the one hand, we think
Schapiro’s account is very helpful in making the shift from technical
competencies (proficiency) to the global status of childhood. On the
other hand, however, she hasn’t yet developed the arguments to
ward off a threatening ‘second demarcation dilemma’. In this second
dilemma, a pragmatic case for age limits yet again stands opposed to
a moral case for competence tests – only this time the object of the
dilemma is autonomy development itself, not any set of technical
competences. Schapiro herself is surprisingly silent on this issue. Self-
constitution marks the transition, and requires that self-constitution
is attributed to someone. But it remains unclear whether or not this
status is attributed on the basis of age. As long as this issue remains
unresolved, Schapiro’s account cannot be applied to a case like Laura
Dekker’s.
The claim that self-constitution is what is constitutive of adult-
hood might suggest that Schapiro is actually defending a compe-
tence-based criterion for demarcating childhood from adulthood.
Indeed, some of her formulations suggest that she believes self-
constitution is sufficient for adulthood. But if we view self-constitu-
tion – understood as comprising the ability to assess matters critically
from an integrated point of view – as the sufficient criterion for
adulthood at any age, we are back to the foregoing difficulties faced
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by competence-based views. Nine-year-olds who precociously
develop mature decision-making skills and a distinctive point of view
would no longer be children – which would put Schapiro squarely in
the camp of the child-liberationists. This implication not only runs
against her stated aim of refuting child-liberationism but is also
morally unattractive. On the other hand, if we stipulate a specific age
as the point at which self-constitution is attributed to individuals, we
seem to be licensing treatment of individuals on the basis of a
morally irrelevant category. Doing so would ignore the fact that self-
constitution involves capacities that some will not yet have devel-
oped and others will have already long had. Laura Dekker, for
example, is not claiming merely that she is a very good sailor but
that this trip matters deeply to her and that she is competent to make
that choice.
How ought one to deal with this second demarcation dilemma,
where self-constitution (or, as we will henceforth say, ‘autonomy-
development’) has taken the place of technical competencies as the
competence criterion? To answer this question, in the next two
sections we will argue that Schapiro’s account of the distinction
between adulthood and childhood and the importance of childhood
tutelage needs to be integrated in a wider context, what we call a
‘regime of childhood’.
V. REGIMES OF CHILDHOOD
As we are using the phrase ‘regime of childhood’, a regime comprises the
set of norms, practices, institutional arrangements, guiding ideals, cri-
teria regarding thresholds, etc. on the basis of which a particular status is
ascribed to individuals – in our case, the status of ‘being a child’. A regime
is constituted by institutionally and culturally backed understandings of
what this status licenses bearers of the status to do, what others are
obligated or forbidden to do, and so on.15 The regime of childhood
centrally includes tutelage and limited decision-making authority. To
speak of a regime is to speak of the entire network of normative inter-
relations. As in the case of other normative statuses (such as citizenship
15 Perhaps the best-known account of the interdependence of normative statuses (such as being a
bearer of rights) and the forms of treatment that those statuses license or prohibit is Hohfeld’s theory of
rights (Hohfeld 1913).
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or mental competence), a regime of childhood is identified and justified
as a package.
As an illustration, take the mundane ‘regime’ governing selling
one’s car. The most relevant change in ‘normative status’ resulting
from the sale is that the seller no longer has any claims to the use of
the car and that the car is now the personal property of the buyer. In
many countries, the sale is embedded in a further set of relations and
institutions. The sale thus also transfers obligations to pay vehicular
taxes, insure the car, and get regular safety or emissions inspections.
At the same time, the seller retains responsibility for paying parking
fines incurred before the sale. And so on. These facts are rarely
specified explicitly in the terms of sale but rather are part of the
relevant ‘regime of vehicular property’ comprising the laws, regu-
lations, and customs that set the terms of what is entailed by a car
sale. This regime describes what it means to become the owner of a
car, and neither buyers nor sellers may alter this regime at will.
Different jurisdictions may decide to arrange matters differently, but
the justification for any particular regime depends on the regime as a
whole.
A regime of childhood comprises an even more complex network
of relations, governing the status change from childhood to adult-
hood. We propose to focus on four distinctive, interlocking aspects
of the specifically ‘modern regime of childhood’: an orientation to-
wards autonomy development, limited liability for children, parental
supervisory responsibilities, and age-based demarcation.16 What is
ultimately at issue in the Dekker case (and others like it) is whether
this regime of childhood is preferable to an alternative in which
adulthood is demarcated less on the basis of age and more on the
basis of competence. Our position is that the modern regime is less
vulnerable to competence-based challenges than defenders of
Dekker’s claim have suggested. In elaborating this position, we de-
scribe how the first three aspects can be seen to fit together. In the
next section we turn to the fourth aspect, the specific issue of how to
handle the diverse ways in which the precocious development of
competence might be viewed as grounds for exemption from age-
based limits on decision-making authority.
16 Talking about a modern regime of childhood risks ignoring genuine and important differences in
the treatment of children between different (modern) countries. We hope that the reader can agree that
for present purposes the similarities are more important than the differences.
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First, the guiding purpose of the modern regime of childhood is a
commitment to autonomy, not as the criterion for a normative
status but as a set of capacities that are important for adult life and
that require a period of development. The current regime of child-
hood is thus by its nature geared toward promoting and making
possible a developmental process. This fact gives it the paternalistic
and ‘perfectionist’ character that so irritates many liberals (Scarre
1980, p. 117). But surely a regime of childhood should enable a
process of maturation. We take it that Schapiro’s articles have suf-
ficiently established this point. We will take the paramount impor-
tance of autonomy as given, and not defend this guiding purpose
against other (say, pre-modern) regimes of childhood in which
autonomy does not play such a fundamental role (e.g. in which
adulthood is connected primarily to the maturation of other capac-
ities). A full defense of the modern regime would of course require
such a comparative investigation of the value of autonomy. We also
omit a discussion of which skills precisely are necessary for being an
autonomous adult in a given society, and what level of development
is necessary for decision-making authority and full responsibility. For
example, as societies become more complex and require more
complex autonomy-capacities, this may very well require a longer
trajectory of development, and therefore a higher age of majority, at
least relative to less complex societies.17
Second, the current regime circumscribes the responsibilities of
children. Minors are not fully accountable for their actions, given
that they are not fully their own. Although this accountability in-
creases with age, minors never have ultimate responsibility. As
Schapiro’s discussion of ‘play’ suggests, limited liability creates a
protected space for the duration of childhood in which there is room
to experiment, explore, and practice with a safety net in place. The
guiding intuition here is that autonomy development is facilitated by
such a circumscribed period of experimentation. Although this
intuition would ultimately have to be supported by empirical re-
search in developmental psychology, support can be found in the
familiar idea that there are costs to moving too quickly to a more
difficult and demanding level of activity. In the case of musical skills
or sports skills, coaches and teachers are regularly cautioning against
17 For a discussion of this Durkheimian perspective, see Anderson (2011).
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children doing exercises or activities for which they are not yet
prepared. Aside from possibilities of injury, the concern here is that
once an athlete or a dancer or pianist has started to put all the
different component parts of the performance together the individ-
ual moves to a different perspective on the performance, and any
attempt to look at the component parts again will always be from
that perspective. There is in this sense, then, no going back. The
‘opportunity costs of premature advancement’ involve a lost
opportunity for a kind of development that occurs best (or perhaps
exclusively) within the framework provided by a particular level of
development. This is just one example of the general point that
having a period of being a novice can be functional for the devel-
opment of certain abilities.
Third, the current regime of childhood can only facilitate modes
of exploration by arranging for a period of tutelage, since the skills
and dispositions required for autonomous adulthood are best
acquired as a novice and with a safety net in place. The justification
of parental authority and responsibility fits in here, in that parental
fiduciary duties are not merely arbitrary impositions of power, but
partly constitutive of the possibility of exploration, rehearsal, and
play as such, since this involves supervision being in place so that the
full responsibility regarding things going wrong does not have to lie
with the child. Parents are responsible not only for giving a child the
possibility to act upon her own decisions as she gradually becomes
capable. They also are responsible for protecting the interests of the
adult the child is to become. Harry Brighouse has usefully drawn a
fourfold distinction between immediate and future welfare interests
and immediate and future agency interests (Brighouse 2003,
p. 701).18 Parents have to take all of these interests into account.
With these three elements of the modern regime of childhood in
the picture, we now can approach the fourth aspect: the demarcation
of childhood on the basis of age. Within the context of a regime of
childhood, the question about demarcation now becomes: What
scheme of supervisory responsibilities on the part of parents and
what duration of the period of childhood tutelage best serves to
realize the fundamental interest in autonomy development? No
18 See also MacLeod, who distinguishes primary goods and ‘intrinsic goods’ of childhood (Macleod
2010, p. 182), and Feinberg, distinguishing a child’s interest in self-determination (autonomy) and in self-
fulfillment (Feinberg 1980).
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longer are we talking about a dilemma of demarcation. Rather, we
are talking about selecting the package of age-based thresholds for
adulthood that best promotes the autonomy interests of individuals.
In the next section we take a closer look at this fourth element of the
regime of childhood.
VI. EMANCIPATION
Any regime of childhood should be explicit about how it deals with
children’s gradual acquisition of competences, both more technical
and autonomy-related competences. To what extent should children
be allowed to act upon their growing competencies and thus be
emancipated from their childhood status? In this section we propose
a way of answering this question by invoking a distinction between
local emancipation and global emancipation. ‘Local emancipation’
will refer to specific exemptions from age-based status-ascriptions
while still remaining under tutelage more generally. ‘Global eman-
cipation’ will refer to exemptions whereby those below the age of
majority are no longer under tutelage at all (although they may not
automatically acquire all of the rights typically accorded to adults,
such as the right to purchase alcohol).
Local emancipation serves to accommodate precocious children
who have reached certain technical competencies in specific do-
mains. Thus, for example, a regime of childhood might allow for
numerous procedures by which minors can apply for exemptions
from default age thresholds. Differing degrees of responsibility and
decision-making authority might be accorded differently across dif-
ferent domains of activity. Commercial and occupational choices, for
example, might be treated differently from choices in medical con-
texts, and experimentation with hobbies and sports might be treated
differently from experimentation with drugs or alcohol. In some
cases, for example, liability or responsibility for foolish or harmful
actions might be shared between children and guardians. Local
emancipation allows for these competence-based exceptions. Making
arrangements in which children gradually take on responsibility and
‘suffer the consequences’ of poor choices are necessary for autonomy
development to be effective. But, as we saw, the very idea of
childhood as a separate status presupposes that parents retain final
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responsibility for the overall process of their children’s development.
The buck stops with them.19
Global emancipation is a different matter, because decision-making
authority is no longer limited to specific contexts. Here, a child is
granted the status of an adult before reaching the legally prescribed age
of majority, and the supervisory role of parents or guardians is ter-
minated. A given regime of childhood might implement global
emancipation in two different ways. The first is to restrict global
emancipation to exceptional circumstances, such as an insurmount-
able conflict between parents and children in the absence of suitable
guardianship arrangements, or (more controversially) when a child
marries. This is how the law in most countries handles global eman-
cipation.20 In such cases, global emancipation is not viewed as valuable
per se, but as part of the best solution to a difficult situation (call this
‘exceptional global emancipation’). The second approach is to make
global emancipation into a straightforward, elective option for quali-
fied children. A regime that takes this path effectively abolishes the age
of majority and endorses an age-neutral, competence-based approach
to demarcation. Most likely this would involve retaining a default age
of majority but permitting children to apply for an assessment of their
level of maturity and autonomy. In a regime of childhood that permits
this ‘elective global emancipation’, it would not be necessary to pro-
vide evidence of exceptional circumstances such as familial hardship.
Allowing the option of suing for adulthood would not abolish the
status-distinction between children and adults altogether. Everyone
still first goes through a phase of childhood before reaching adulthood.
But the moment of transition would be radically transformed along the
lines of a competence-based, age-neutral approach.21
19 One might compare this to the responsibility a Minister has for all the actions by his civil servants.
Although the latter are competent to perform tasks, only the former can be held accountable for these
acts in Parliament.
20 Even in cases of emancipation, at least in the Dutch system, the judge must still specify which
adult rights the child will be allowed to have. To the extent that a child is not granted one or more adult
rights, it could be argued that the case remains one of local emancipation rather than global emanci-
pation, if one takes it that the latter requires full assimilation to adult status. For an in-depth treatment
of emancipation in actual legal practice, we refer the reader to Gardner (1994). Our discussion of ‘global
emancipation’ here is best understood in the context of our analysis of the demarcation dilemma and
regimes of childhood. A comparison with the details of contemporary law and legal practice would
require a separate discussion.
21 In addition to exceptional and elective emancipation, which both originate in a wish to be
emancipated on the part of the child and/or parent, one might consider non-voluntary forms of
emancipation, such as when a child is prosecuted and convicted on the basis of adult criminal law. We
thank one of the referees for drawing our attention to this additional form of emancipation.
SAILING ALONE: TEENAGE AUTONOMY AND REGIMES OF CHILDHOOD 513
Our position is that elective global emancipation is problematic,
and that both local emancipation and exceptional global emancipa-
tion are more defensible. In supporting this position, we must ex-
plain why we oppose giving children who meet the minimal
requirements for autonomy the corresponding decision-making
authority. If we are willing to endorse exemptions from age
restrictions in specific domains on grounds of technical competence,
why not allow exemptions for the restriction that ultimately matters
most, childhood tutelage itself? Of course, the kinds of pragmatic
considerations mentioned in Sect. III – administrative costs and
dangers of biases in testing – play a role here. Elective global
emancipation would be an addition to the current legal system and
raise administrative costs. The biases when judging autonomy
development are likely to be much more severe than when testing
competencies for relatively circumscribed sets of activities (like
driving). As we mentioned in Sect. III, the courts’ treatment of
Dekker’s developmental opportunities was much more contentious
than its assessment of her sailing competencies. However, these
pragmatic considerations alone do not provide a definitive objection
to elective global emancipation and therefore still keep us trapped in
the second (higher-level) demarcation dilemma.
Within the context of a regime of childhood, we are now in a
position to supplement these pragmatic considerations with inher-
ently relational considerations. We have to decide whether allowing
some children to leave the childhood phase earlier than others
undermines the beneficial effects of the regime on all children. We
think there are three regime-specific reasons to be critical of elective
emancipation.
A first reason is the need for stable expectations with respect to the
parent–child relationship. A regime needs to give parents feasible
structures to perform the responsibilities attributed to them as part
of the regime. It is plausible that a strongly competence-based ap-
proach to demarcating childhood and adulthood would undermine
the ability of parents to carry out their responsibilities effectively
(thereby jeopardizing the long-term autonomy interests of the chil-
dren involved). Allowing the child’s status to be a constant focus of
negotiation and renegotiation creates uncertainties that strain par-
ent–child relationships. If so, one of the advantages of age-based
JOEL ANDERSON AND RUTGER CLAASSEN514
criteria is clear. Publicly recognized rites of passage at particular ages
introduce much-needed stabilizing points of reference into the
complex process by which parents navigate with their teenage
children the transition to adulthood, as in, ‘When you’re 18, you can
decide that for yourself, but not yet’.
A second reason for not allowing global emancipation is that it
would tend to undermine healthy in-group relations between children.
Compare this phenomenon to the controversy about mandatory
health insurance. In many countries, the state requires non-indigent
individuals to purchase health insurance. This requirement enables
the state to pool many different risks, so that health coverage can be
extended to all at a moderate price. It may be advantageous for
‘good risks’ (those with good health expectations) to be allowed to
exit the collective pool and insure themselves. The ‘bad risks’ that
remain behind, however, will pay a much higher price.22 A similar
argument can be made against the elective emancipatory option. If
most children turn out not to be interested in early emancipation,
there would be no negative consequences for the regime.23 But if
many would try to exit, a schism might be created among children,
who are often very anxious about belonging within their peer group.
Some would feel inferior because they haven’t qualified for the adult-
test (or, even worse, have failed it). Others would be stressed about
trying to meet the test. These results could severely strain relations
among children.
A third reason relates to the potential for inequality between
children. In an elective emancipatory regime, children from stable
and fortunate family backgrounds are the most likely to succeed in
opting out. Existing inequalities of power, wealth, and social status
can be expected to worsen. The practical consequences of a gen-
eralized practice of differentiation in seeking adulthood status are
difficult to foresee. Still, it would be surprising if the sphere-trans-
gressing influence of money would not come to play the role it has
in so many other aspects of life (Walzer 1983).
22 The mandatory scheme is justified since, under a veil of ignorance where you don’t know if you
are a good or bad risk, most would choose to have mandatory collective pooling.
23 This might well be the case: after all, not bearing final responsibility is also comfortable. The
question is what these children would gain, if there are no pressing circumstances such as those that
already count as a reason for exceptional global emancipation.
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Before continuing, we would like to address two potential objec-
tions. The first is that we are exaggerating the problems with per-
mitting elective global emancipation because the number of cases will
be vanishingly small. But are there reasons to believe it will be rare?
Two possibilities are worth discussing. The level of global
emancipation might be low because few children request it or
because most requests for emancipation would be denied on the
merits. Take the first possibility. If the criteria are set at a relatively
relaxed level, such that 10% of 12-year-old children qualify, it might
still be thought that few would actually take advantage of the
exemption before the age of 16 or 18. But it is very risky policy-
making to permit an option that would be problematic if pursued
widely on the basis of an assumption about the low numbers of
people who would be inclined to take advantage of it. Trends can
change, and trying to roll back these permissions would be politically
difficult. Alternatively, it might be thought that few children would
qualify even if they wanted to do so. Indeed, a regime of childhood
could ensure this result by setting the bar very high. But suppose it
then turned out, as we think likely, that the only way to keep the
number of qualifying 15- or 16-year-olds to low levels would be to
require aspirant adults to demonstrate exceptionally well-developed
skills in self-discipline, rational planning, emotional maturity, and so
on. If so, we are back to the objections raised earlier by critics of
competence-based approaches to demarcating childhood. Not only
are young persons required to meet a higher standard for full-fledged
adulthood, but defining full-fledged adulthood in such demanding
terms would put pressure on the touchstone liberal assumption that
individuals above the age of 18 (or 21) ought to count, by default, as
genuine adults.
Furthermore, we do not accept the assumption that elective
global emancipation is problematic only if large numbers of minors
take advantage of the opportunity. We have compelling reasons to
take global emancipation off the table as an elective option (and to
permit it only when doing so is required to avoid a significant harm).
The foremost such reason is grounded in the expressive value of a
competence-neutral boundary between childhood and adulthood. As
several legal philosophers have argued, part of the purpose of law
consists in what it expresses about the significance of certain actions,
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institutions, and practices (Anderson and Pildes 2000; Sunstein 1995).
A policy of elective global emancipation would express a view of
childhood as defined by thresholds of competence. It thus equates
childhood with a condition of inability that children can leave as soon
as they have acquired the necessary skills. It becomes a golden cage
that children escape by convincing their parole board they are ready
for life on the outside. Rejecting elective global emancipation in favor
of the approach we have proposed replaces this message with an
emphasis on a period of time in which the development of individual
autonomy is central as a societal value and goal. It is a phase of life
devoted to the structured and supervised acquisition of autonomy.
It might be objected, second, that our approach adds nothing
significant to an approach based exclusively on the practical advan-
tages of a clear line of demarcation. As we acknowledged in Sect. III,
it is often appropriate to rely on a notion of the ‘standard person’
(Feinberg 1986, p. 326). This reliance minimizes administrative and
juridical responsibilities that drain public coffers, overburden the
legitimacy of the courts, or expose individuals to the risk of biased
treatment. Thus the courts and legislatures could just say that the
‘standard 15-year-old’ is ill-prepared for global emancipation and
leave it at that. We believe that such an exclusive focus on admin-
istrative reasons is inadequate, for it fails to take seriously both the
strongly held objections of teens such as Dekker and the real
importance of childhood as a context for autonomy development.
Having now formulated a principled set of objections to elective
global emancipation on the basis of a reconceptualization of the
demarcation dilemma in terms of regimes of childhood, we finally
return to the Dekker case.
VII. SAILING ALONE?
Although we do not aim to resolve the question of whether Laura
Dekker ought to have been allowed to sail, in this section we will
point to relevant features of the case that would need to be decided
in order to answer that question. What is intriguing about Dekker’s
case is that part of what has been in dispute is whether allowing her
to sail alone constitutes what we have called local or global eman-
cipation. Our position is that it would be less problematic if she (and
her father) were suing for merely local emancipation. In that case,
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provisions would have to have been made to enable the father to
carry out his supervisory duties. Otherwise, we have a situation of de
facto global emancipation.
Above, we argued that an essential component of any regime of
childhood is the suspension of full responsibility. One way to bring
this out is by imagining the public response to news that Dekker had
drowned as compared with the news that someone twice her age,
undertaking the same feat, had drowned. In the case of adults, we
would view it as a tragic loss, but perhaps also partly the result of
foolishness by the adult sailor. In the case of a young teen, we
suspect that any doubts about the judgments involved would be
directed not primarily at the child but at her parents. For the reasons
discussed earlier, this shift is entirely appropriate. Children take risks,
but the results of this risk-taking are at least partly the responsibility
of parents. And it is, we have suggested, central to the currently
accepted regime of childhood that children be protected from the full
brunt of responsibility for their exploratory and risk-taking activities
in order to develop into autonomous persons.
In this regard, it is interesting to consider the role of Laura’s
father, Dick Dekker, who supported his daughter throughout the
proceedings.24 Dick Dekker’s willingness to let Laura undertake the
solo trip could be interpreted as entailing a willingness to accord her
the status of an adult. On this view, he could be seen as supporting
his daughter’s plan by effectively ceding his guardianship. And,
indeed, given a regime of childhood in which children’s immunity
from full responsibility is tied to the parents bearing that responsi-
bility, Dick Dekker’s relinquishing his responsibilities amounts to an
attempt to effect his daughter’s global emancipation. Importantly,
however, a parent cannot decide on his or her own to relinquish
these responsibilities, even if the child wants him to do so. It is
essential to the regime of childhood as we know it that no one can
be removed from the status of being a child by parental fiat. Dekker’s
father can decide to relinquish guardianship, but the state auto-
24 We see no reason to doubt that the impetus and driving force behind the plan to sail around the
world lay with Laura Dekker and not her father, although this may well play a decisive role in analyzing
other cases, such as those of child performers. In Dekker’s case, it is the child who is seeking (some form
of) emancipation. Note that a potentially complicating factor that we bracket is the opposition of
Laura’s mother, from whom she was estranged. Of course, since we do not have full access to the court
documents, we cannot here make any adjudication of what Mr. Dekker’s actual motives, intentions, or
judgments are in the case. We have focused instead on the implications of possible scenarios.
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matically steps into the resulting vacuum. Were Mr. Dekker’s aim to
end his daughter’s childhood, the courts would be correct to deny his
suit.
Alternatively, Mr. Dekker might actually understand himself to be
still exercising his parental responsibilities by adequately and
appropriately supervising his daughter, albeit at a distance. In our
opinion, this route is more fruitful. Dekker’s case has to be inter-
preted as one of local emancipation. What does this mean for
judging the permissibility of her journey?
First, this means courts cannot avoid saying something about
the scope of the responsibility that parents must exercise. Using the
fourfold distinction introduced by Brighouse (see Sect. V above),
they should take into account the probability that Dekker will
normally enjoy her trip (that she has an immediate welfare interest
in it). Furthermore, assuming all goes well, the trip could be ex-
pected to train several parts of her agency (representing an
immediate agency interest). However, what courts still must
squarely face is the question of whether the trip could also be
expected to advance the interests of the person she is later going to
be, both in terms of agency and welfare. It might just as well turn
out to thwart her future agency (e.g. if her personality develop-
ment has been stunted) or her future welfare (e.g. if she later
regrets not having spent her teenage years among peers). The
court treated these kinds of future interests in terms of Dekker’s
social, emotional and identity development. As mentioned in Sect.
II, the court could not properly assess these interests because
Dekker and her family did not fully cooperate. On our account,
however, this assessment is imperative and the fact that the court
waived it can be criticised as too permissive.
Second, the development of children’s autonomy requires parental
supervision. Parents need to be able to intervene if they judge the
child to be insufficiently competent to make decisions or carry out
specific plans. Whether this supervision requires parents to conduct
more or less continuous monitoring of children depends on several
circumstances: the precise details of the planned journey Dekker is
undertaking, the technological resources that are available for mon-
itoring at a distance, and so on. We are not in a position to judge
whether the relevant criteria are met in this specific case; we simply
argue that these considerations should have been central to the
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court’s deliberations. Note that this issue is different from Dekker’s
technical competencies – the issue on which the court focused. The
point about supervision is not merely about safety. Rather, it is an
issue of whether or not the supervisory responsibilities constitutive of
parenthood can be exercised under the circumstances of a solo cir-
cumnavigation. Childhood requires guardians, whose role is often –
particularly in adolescence – that of a safety-net, background monitor,
and ‘sleeper’ supervisor, who swings into action when needed. To
fulfill this role, there needs to be not only enough communication,
but also an ongoing relationship that provides a supportive context
for constructive intervention.
Of course, the supervisory responsibilities of parents change as the
child approaches the age of majority. Hence parents must judge the
extent to which their children are able to handle new responsibilities,
even if they lack ultimate responsibility. So it might not be prob-
lematic that Dekker has a lot of decision-making responsibility on her
journey if she turns out to have developed her personality to such an
extent that she can independently handle a great many unexpected
situations. One might still worry, however, that the waiver from
actual supervision that Dekker gets from her father is so generic and
across-the-board that she seems to gain something like decision-
making authority on her trip – just the thing that distinguishes global
emancipation from local emancipation. Whether this is the case is
something the courts must decide. If Dekker’s sailing plan excluded
global emancipation in words only, but in effect would be a case of
global emancipation under the guise of local emancipation, the courts
would have had reason to prohibit her plans.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have taken the Dekker case as a point of departure
for examining the legal, moral and political status of childhood. We
have shown how the debate about the Dekker case deadlocked by
being framed in terms of the dilemma ‘age versus competence’. We
have argued that we should move beyond this dilemma by recon-
ceptualizing the distinction between childhood and adulthood as one
of status. This opens up a more fruitful – though decidedly more
complicated – debate over various ways of arranging and institu-
JOEL ANDERSON AND RUTGER CLAASSEN520
tionalizing a ‘regime of childhood’. The issue of emancipation is one
important part of the specific regime of childhood in modern Western
societies, which strongly emphasizes the idea of maturing into an
autonomous person. It is our hope that the usefulness of thinking of
childhood as a normative status accorded within a regime extends
beyond the issue of emancipation. Other controversial issues and
court cases surrounding childhood can also be analyzed in these
terms.
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